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Abstract   
While an individualist society prizes personal control, autonomy and individual 
accomplishments, a collectivist society puts a premium on loyalty and cohesion and 
imposes mutual obligations in the context of in-groups. It has been argued that 
individualism will promote economic development directly by sharpening individual 
incentives to invest, innovate and accumulate wealth. In this article, I argue that the 
individualist-collectivist dimension can also affect development through its impact on 
governance. The in-group favoritism inherent to collectivist societies is likely to 
engender corruption, nepotism and clientelism in the public sphere. In individualist 
societies, the relative weakness of in-group pressures and an emphasis on personal 
achievement and worth will contribute towards a more meritocratic and efficient public 
sector. My empirical evidence confirms the strong positive relationship between 
individualism and government quality. Moreover, I provide robust empirical evidence 
showing that the expected direct positive impact of individualism on economic 
development disappears when additionally controlling for governance, a finding which 
suggests that insofar as individualism affects development it does so because it 
promotes good governance.  
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Introduction 
The individualist-collectivist dimension (I-C) has been identified by social 
psychologists as the most fruitful way of explaining cultural differences across societies 
(Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier 2002; Kashima and Kashima 2003). An 
individualist society is one where ties between individuals are loose and everyone is 
expected to look after themselves and their immediate family while in a collectivist one 
people are born into tightly knit in-groups which protect them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede and Hofstede 2010). Individualist societies put rights 
above duties and emphasize personal control, autonomy and accomplishments while 
collectivist ones impose mutual obligations and expectations in the context of in-groups 
which are perceived to have common fates and goals (Hofstede 1980; Schwartz 1990; 
Triandis 1995).  
Because of the potential importance of the I-C dimension, Gorodnichenko and Roland 
(from here on G-R) have developed an important line of work exploring the extent to 
which this cleavage can explain cross-country differences in the level of economic 
development. Thus, G-R (2011a, 2013) argue that because individualist cultures attach 
social status to personal achievements while collectivist ones tend to be conformist, then 
the former are likely to foster innovations and discoveries which are instrumental in 
promoting long run growth. In line with this, they provide empirical evidence of a 
strong positive causal effect of individualism on innovation and measures of long-run 
growth. Moreover, G-R (2011b) empirically explore the impact of a range of cultural 
variables on GDP per capita – including measures of social hierarchy, risk aversion, 
generalized trust, tolerance and attitudes to work – and identify I-C as the most 
economically important and statistically robust cultural dimension.  
In this article I explore the extent to which the I-C cleavage impacts on economic 
development through government quality which broadly refers to the extent that the 
state secures private property and the rule of law, is free of corruption and is endowed 
with an efficient public administration (La Porta et al. 1999). A large literature in 
economics has identified the crucial role of good government for economic 
development (for example, North 1990; Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001; 
Rodrik et al. 2004). Secure property rights and equality before the law encourage 
investments in physical and human capital and technology thus setting the foundation 
for long-run growth (Acemoglu et al. 2005). Corruption is inimical to development 
since it implies the misallocation of public resources both directly, because of the 
appropriation of public resources for private gain, and indirectly, insofar as it distorts 
collective decision-making (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Bardhan 1997). And an efficient 
public administration opens the way for the cost-effective provision of public goods 
beneficial for sustained economic growth (Mauro 1995; Evans and Rauch 1999).
1
  
The connection between I-C and governance has been made by several authors. Tanzi 
(1994) describes how individualistic societies tend to apply the “arms length principle” 
                                                          
1
 Empirical work has tended to equate government quality with formal institutional quality and 
has typically measured it by way of a perception-based index of protection against expropriation 
(for example, Acemoglu et al. 2001). However, Glaeser et al. (2004) show that such indicators 
are uncorrelated with objective measures of formal institutional constraints and suggest that this 
is because they measure outcomes rather than formal institutional constraints per se. For this 
reason I prefer the term government quality or governance instead of institutional quality (see 
also, Kyriacou 2014).  
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such that public decisions are guided by universalistic and objective criteria rather than 
personal relationships and cronyism. He suggests that in collectivist societies such 
behavior would seem alien and even immoral and would conflict with social norms that 
put family and friends first. In his monumental work on the emergence of rule of law 
and political order more generally, Fukuyama (2011, 2014) describes patrimonial states 
staffed with family and friends with little or no effort to treat citizens impersonally on 
the basis of universally applied rules. These states are likely to suffer from nepotism, 
clientelism and corruption. While not strictly framing his discussion in the context of 
the I-C cleavage, this author identifies the weakening of kinship ties and the emergence 
of individualism as important milestones on the road towards the attainment of rule of 
law.  
Given the potential link between the I-C dimension and governance, in this article I 
empirically reexamine the causal impact of this cleavage on economic development in 
the presence of government quality. As such, this contribution can be placed in the 
context of a growing literature examining the effect of different cultural dimensions on 
governance and economic development (for a review, see Alesina and Giuliano 2014). 
My empirical results are revealing. I find that the I-C dimension impacts on 
development entirely through its effect on governance. Specifically, I find that more 
individualistic countries tend to be wealthier because this particular cultural trait 
endows them with better quality governments. My findings are robust to the 
introduction of a range of potentially confounding variables as well as the application of 
estimation methods which deal directly with the presence of reverse causality or, in 
other words, the possibility that economic development may be an important factor 
driving both individualism and good governance. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section I review previous work which has 
discussed the impact of the I-C cleavage on development either directly or indirectly 
through government quality. Having done so, I present my choice of data and empirical 
method. After that I report and discuss the main result and explore their robustness. I 
then conclude the article.  
Previous work  
Several scholars have explored the direct effect of I-C on long-run growth. Ball (2001) 
draws from Bauer and Yamey (1957) and Lewis (1965) to explain how in developing 
country settings, the strength of in-groups such as the extended family may be 
advantageous because they can provide informal insurance, but in more developed 
economies they may undermine growth prospects because social obligations to share 
within the family or group are likely to reduce individual incentives to invest and 
accumulate wealth. Consistent with this, Platteau (2000) points out that the fact that 
redistributive norms are not applied to foreign entrepreneurs is one reason why they 
tend to do relatively well in the host countries. More recently, experimental evidence 
from a number of developing countries has provided support for the idea that 
individuals faced with kinship pressures to share their wealth, adopt evasive strategies 
such as “excessive borrowing” to signal that one is cash constrained (Baland et al. 
2011), or reductions in profitable but observable investment incomes to the possible 
detriment of economic growth (Jakiela and Ozier 2015).  
Gorodnichnko and Roland (2011a, 2013) have proposed that, from a theoretical 
perspective at least, the direct impact of individualism on long-run growth is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, to the extent that individualism attaches social prestige to 
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personal achievements this is likely to spur innovation to the benefit of growth. On the 
other hand, collectivism can promote growth insofar as it facilitates the coordination of 
production factors and collective action more generally. (Conversely, individualism can 
hamper growth insofar as it undermines social coordination while collectivism can do 
so to the extent that it imposes conformism thus blunting individual initiative.) These 
scholars argue that the expected benefits of individualism affects the dynamic efficiency 
of the economy while the benefits of collectivism impact on static efficiency and, as 
such, they expect the former to swamp the latter. Consistent with this, their empirical 
analysis reveals a strong positive effect of individualism on output per worker, 
productivity and innovation.   
Another body of work has considered the possible impact of the I-C dimension on 
governance. Scott (1972) explains that in traditional societies, parochial ties and gift-
giving practices permeate inter-personal relationships and explain the high incidence of 
corruption in developing countries. Similarly, Tanzi (1994) states that the public sphere 
in collectivist societies is characterized by clientelistic networks which act according to 
rules of reciprocity that have their origin in a kinship-based social organization, 
something which fuels patronage and corruption (see also, Chabal and Daloz 1999 and 
Smith 2003). Alternatively, he identifies individualist societies as ones approaching the 
Weberian ideal of rational-legal bureaucracy where public administrators are hired and 
promoted based on merit and who follow rational procedures and universalistic 
principles.  
Fukuyama (2011, 2014) goes further and describes two biological sources of in-group 
favoritism namely kin selection and reciprocal altruism or exchange of favors or 
resources between unrelated individuals. He makes the point that if individuals are 
hardwired towards in-group favoritism, the existence of societies that have diverged 
from this must be due to the emergence of socially constructed behavior. This matter is 
taken up by Greif (2006) in his study of the historical emergence of formal institutions 
ensuring contract enforcement. This scholar argues that in collectivist societies, 
individuals mostly interact with members of identified in-groups (familial, religious, 
tribal or ethnic) and contract enforcement is achieved through informal institutions. 
Alternatively, in individualistic societies, peoples' membership of groups is fluid and 
changing and individuals transact across groups while contract enforcement is achieved 
mainly through specialized organizations, such as courts. Crucially, Greif (2006) makes 
the important point that the historical emergence of formal institutions supported 
impersonal exchange thus enlarging the size of the market, something which facilitated 
the division of labor and ultimately long-run growth (see, also North 1990 and Wallis 
2009).
2
  
Conceptually therefore, both the direct impact of individualism on economic 
development and the indirect impact through governance is expected to be positive. The 
issue at hand is whether individualism impacts on development directly after controlling 
for government quality or, in other words, the extent to which the impact of the I-C 
cleavage on development passes through governance. In a related piece, Licht et al. 
(2007) provide empirical evidence supporting the expectation that individualism will 
                                                          
2
 The origins of individualism and collectivism may go back to the very distant past. In the next 
section I point to the possible role of geography and religion in explaining cross-country 
differences in I-C.  Macfarlane (1978) argues that individualism already existed in 13
th
 century 
England.  
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tend to improve government quality while collectivism undermines it but do not 
empirically explore the impact of culture and governance on economic development. 
This is an issue taken up by G-R (2013) who acknowledge the potentially confounding 
effect of governance on the estimated impact of individualism on long-run growth. 
When they introduce government quality in their regressions - specifically a measure of 
protection from expropriation risk - they find that both institutions and individualism 
have a positive and statistically significant effect on their measures of long-run growth, 
and that the impact of individualism is the more statistically robust of the two. When 
governance is controlled for, the point estimate of individualism is significantly reduced 
suggesting that these two variables are related and indeed, the authors pursue the 
relationship between individualism and governance empirically and find stronger 
evidence that the direction of causality flows from individualism to government quality.  
In light of the literature linking the I-C cleavage or in-group favoritism with 
governance, in the remainder article I will empirically revisit the extent to which 
individualism impacts on economic development separately from government quality. 
In doing so, I diverge from G-R (2013) on several accounts. First, my main empirical 
estimates are based on a larger cross-section of countries: up to 93 countries compared 
to a maximum of 75 employed by G-R. Second, given the previous discussion linking 
the I-C cleavage to different dimensions of governance and from there to economic 
development, I employ governance indicators which incorporate information on 
government quality beyond the risk of expropriation.  
Third, I employ alternative instrumental variables for both individualism and 
government quality to account for the impact of development on both. G-R 
acknowledge that their main instrument for individualism, a measure of genetic distance 
between the population in a given country and that of the USA or the UK which are the 
most individualistic countries in the sample, is hampered by the fact that it may be 
instrumenting for other cultural dimensions apart from I-C. They attempt to address this 
limitation by way of alternative instruments which previous work has linked to I-C: two 
genetically-based instruments, another reflecting the prevalence of infectious diseases, 
and a fourth one based on linguistic rules. However, the use of gene-based and 
linguistic instruments severely reduces their sample (to between 23 and 39 
observations) while the extent to which pathogen prevalence satisfies the exclusion 
restriction can been questioned because the disease burden can have a direct effect on 
development (Gallup et al. 1999; Sachs 2003). With regards to the instrumental variable 
chosen for governance, they employ settler mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001) as 
well as a version of that data from Albouy (2012). Again, the choice of this variable 
reduces their sample (to 35 countries). Moreover, the resultant F-statistics from the first 
stage regression raise the problem, recognized by the authors, of weak instruments;  
specifically the likelihood that the estimated standard errors are far too small (Murray 
2006).  
Before closing this section a word is in order about related but distinct literature. One 
line of work has explored the impact of strong family ties on socio-economic outcomes. 
This work is inspired by Banfield's (1958) argument that at the heart of the relative 
underdevelopment of Southern Italy is 'amoral familism' or the tendency of individuals 
to maximize the material advantage of the nuclear family and assume that others will do 
the same. This behavior translates into a distrust of strangers or, conversely the absence 
of generalized trust which impedes profitable market exchange (Arrow 1972; Knack 
and Keefer 1997) but also undermines political participation and government efficiency 
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(Putnam et al. 1993, Knack 2002; Guiso et al. 2008). Alesina and Giuliano (2013) go 
beyond generalized trust and measure family ties by way of survey responses to 
questions regarding the importance of the family, respect for parents and parental duties. 
They find strong family ties to be inversely related to economic development, political 
participation and governance.  
Another, line of work starts with Platteau's (2000) distinction between limited and 
generalized morality: in the former individuals restrict the application of ethical 
standards to in-groups and opportunistic behavior is morally acceptable outside these 
groups, while in the latter the same ethical or moral standards are extended to in-groups 
and strangers. This echoes the notion of particularized versus generalized trust and, 
indeed, this author equates generalized morality with trust and respect for strangers. 
Inspired by this insight Tabellini (2008) shows that societies with low trust levels, and 
which score low on a question asking if tolerance and respect for other people is an 
important quality for children to learn, have worse government quality. Moreover, 
Tabellini (2010) combines these societal traits with others and finds them to be 
important determinants of the level of economic development in Europe.  
Obviously, inasmuch as family ties and the notion of limited morality describe an 
individual tendency towards in-group favoritism, these two concepts are conceptually 
similar to the I-C cleavage. However, there are differences. Banfield's "amoral 
familism" and the indicators used to measure family ties tend to focus on the strength of 
ties within the nuclear family while from the perspective of the I-C dimension the 
relevant in-group can be much larger. The notion of limited morality resembles what is 
typically understood by collectivism but generalized morality does not necessarily map 
neatly with individualism which also refers to self-reliance, personal control, autonomy 
and initiative. Consistent with this, the simple correlations between the main measure of 
the I-C divide employed in the empirical analysis below and measures of family ties and 
generalized trust are -0.501 (between I-C and family ties) and 0.418 (between I-C and 
trust). Notwithstanding this discussion, in the empirical analysis below I control for 
generalized trust to account for its confounding effect. 
Data and Empirical Method  
I follow G-R (2011a, 2013) and employ the Hofstede (2010) conceptualization and data 
as the main measure of the I-C dimension. This data was originally available for around 
40 countries but has been expanded over time and currently covers 102. The country 
scores are generated on the basis of country-specific surveys which ask a broad range of 
questions the responses to which are then aggregated using factor analysis. The I-C 
cleavage emerges as the most important component of this analysis among several 
others including, power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. The resultant 
scores range from 0 to 100 (here normalized between 0 and 1), with higher scores 
reflecting a more individualist society. Perhaps the most fruitful way to define what the 
author means by an individualist or collectivist society in relation to the public sphere is 
by considering his on-line description of two societies identified as such by his analysis 
(see, Appendix B for the web source):  
 
“Australia, with a score of 90 on this dimension, is a highly individualistic 
culture. This translates into a loosely-knit society in which the expectation is that 
people look after themselves and their immediate families. In the business world, 
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employees are expected to be self-reliant and display initiative. Also, within the 
exchange-based world of work, hiring and promotion decisions are based on 
merit or evidence of what one has done or can do." 
"Angola’s very low score of 18 means that it is considered a collectivistic 
society. This is evident in a close, long-term commitment to the member 'group', 
be that a family, extended family, or extended relationships. Loyalty in a 
collectivist culture is paramount and overrides most other societal rules and 
regulations. The society fosters strong relationships where everyone takes 
responsibility for fellow members of their group. In collectivist societies: 
offence leads to shame and the loss of face, employer/employee relationships are 
perceived in moral terms (like a family link), hiring and promotion decisions 
take account of the employee’s in-group and management is the management of 
groups." 
In my sample of countries, the most individualist country is the United States followed 
by Australia and the United Kingdom while the most collectivist is Guatemala followed 
by Ecuador and Panama (see appendix A for the summary statistics and appendix B for 
definitions and sources of all the variables employed in this article).  
As a robustness check I employ an alternative measure of the I-C cleavage from 
Schwartz (1994) who generates several cultural value orientations including one he 
labels Autonomy versus Embeddedness (see also Licht et al. 2007 and G-R 2013). 
There are two types of autonomy: intellectual and affective. The former encourages 
individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions independently while the 
latter them to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. In embeddedness 
cultures, meaning in life comes through social relationships and group identification and 
action. Such cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that 
might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. The measure of I-C I employ is 
the first principle component of the intellectual and affective autonomies and 
embeddedness under the assumption is that the correlations between the three variables 
can be causally ascribed to the individualism-collectivism dimension. The simple 
correlation between it and the Hofstede variable is 0.638 thus indicating the usefulness 
of the former for robustness purposes.  
To measure governance, I employ four variables from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) which measure the risk of investment (including the risk of 
expropriation), an assessment of corruption in the public sector (including patronage, 
nepotism and favors for favors), law and order (both impartial courts and popular 
observance of the law) and the quality of the bureaucracy (independent and 
meritocratic). The values for each of these dimensions are normalized between 0 and 1 
and then aggregated by taking their average. Higher values of indicate better 
governance. In the sample employed here countries with the best governance according 
to this indicator are Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands while government 
quality is especially low in countries like Iraq, Sierra Leone and Bangladesh.
3
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 Another source of governance data are the World Bank World Governance Indicators which 
provide information on government effectiveness (the quality of public services and the public 
administration), regulatory quality, rule of law (which includes the quality of contract 
enforcement) and control of corruption. However, the simple correlation between the ICRG 
aggregate measure and that which results when combining the above dimensions (as suggested 
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To measure economic development I employ the logarithm of real GDP per capita from 
the Penn World Tables. Moreover, in line with G-R (2011a, 2013), I also examine the 
robustness of my findings when instead I employ the log of real GDP per worker and 
current Total Factor Productivity (both from Penn) and the logarithm of total patent 
applications by residents from the World Development Indicators.  
Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here 
In figure 1 below I plot real GDP per capita against my main indicator of the I-C 
cleavage while figure 2 does the same but additionally controlling for governance as 
measured by the ICRG aggregate indicator. Although preliminary since these figures are 
silent on the direction of causality and the impact of important covariates, they are 
suggestive of the important role played by governance in the relationship between 
development and the I-C cleavage. When controlling for governance, the positive 
relationship between individualism and development disappears. Alternatively, the 
positive association between individualism and governance persists after controlling for 
GDP per capita (figure 3). These results are reflected by the simple correlations between 
these variables: the simple correlation between the logarithm of GDP per capita and the 
Hofstede measure of individualism is 0.605 and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
but becomes  0.007 with a p-value of 0.945 when controlling for government quality. 
On the other hand, the correlation between individualism and governance after 
controlling for development is 0.549 with a p-value of 0.    
One important factor driving individualism may be economic development. 
Collectivism will be stronger in poor, rural societies because resource scarcity makes 
people dependent on in-groups while, conversely, economic development will tend to 
foster individualism because it liberates people from the urgency of covering basic 
needs (Triandis 1995; Ingelhart and Oyserman 2004; Hofstede and Hofstede 2010; 
Hruschka and Henrich 2013). Economic development may also be an important 
determinant of government quality simply because good governance may be costly 
(Islam and Montenegro 2002) or because development promotes education and literacy 
and, as a result, creates a demand for better governance (La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 
2000).  
To deal with the potential incidence of economic development on both the I-C cleavage 
and governance I employ instrumental variables and TSLS estimation. To instrument 
for I-C I turn to the grammatical rule on pronoun drop (see also, Licht et al. 2007 and 
Tabellini 2008). Languages that use pronouns 'I' or 'you' tend to highlight the individual 
while the drop of these pronouns is indicative of societies that embed the individual in 
social contexts and thus suggest collectivism (Kashima and Kashima 1998). I employ a 
recent data set which provides information on pronoun drop for up to ninety-four 
countries (Abdurazokzoda and Davis 2014). To instrument government quality I resort 
to legal traditions. Specifically I employ binary variables which identify a country as 
having a Soviet, French, German, Scandinavian or British legal tradition; traditions 
which date back to the 17
th
 century in the case of British common law or the 19
th
 in the 
case of civil law (French, German and Scandinavian). The basic rational is that legal 
origins reflect the relative power of the state vis-à-vis property owners and specifically, 
state power tends to be highest in countries with a Soviet legal tradition, lower in those 
with a civil law tradition and lowest in those with a common law tradition (La Porta et 
                                                                                                                                                                          
by Langbein and Knack 2010) is 0.961 meaning that the latter is not very useful for robustness 
purposes.  
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al. 1999). Compared to common law, civil law aims to replace market-driven outcomes 
with state-desired allocations (La Porta et al. 2008). La Porta et al. (1999, 2008) show 
that legal origins are robustly associated with a range of governance indicators including 
property right protection, corruption, regulatory efficiency and bureaucratic red tape.
4
    
My empirical strategy also deals with the confounding effect of variables which can 
reasonably be expected to be related to economic development, the I-C dimension and 
governance that, if neglected, may produce omitted variable bias. In particular in the 
regressions displayed in the results section below, I always control for continental fixed 
effects, a country's distance from the equator and its religious heritage. I control for 
latitude because Diamond (1997) has explained the importance of a large land-mass 
across an East-West axis for technological diffusion and, ultimately, long-run growth. 
In addition, Gallup et al. (1999) have argued that the geographic location of the tropics 
could undermine development because it increases the disease burden. Distance from 
the equator can also affect governance by defining natural endowments and the disease 
environment, both factors which scholars have suggested may have influenced the 
institutional environment which emerged in the new world after colonization 
(Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et al. 2004). Finally, it has 
been argued that from an evolutionary perspective, the higher pathogen prevalence 
characteristic of the climatic conditions associated with proximity to the equator, leads 
people to limit interactions with out-groups in an effort to minimize the risk of infection 
and, as a result, helps explain the existence of collectivist cultures (Fincher et al. 2008).  
Religion has been linked to individualism, governance and development. Max Weber 
argued that Protestantism by putting emphasis on individual responsibility and self-
reliance helped to “shatter the fetters of the kinship group” (quoted in Ball 2001; see 
also Oyserman et al. 2002). Relatedly, Goody (1983) explains that the Catholic church 
took a strong stand against traditions such as consanguineous marriages in order to 
reduce the control of property by kinship groups and increase that in Church hands 
through bequests (see also, Greif 2006). Religion can also impact on institutions beyond 
its effect on I-C. Fukuyama (2011) explains how, in the 11th century, the Catholic 
Church strove to protect itself from secular powers by promoting the idea that secular 
leaders were neither above the law nor the ultimate source of law thus setting the basis 
for the development of the rule of law. Compared to Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam 
and the Eastern Orthodox tradition are more hierarchical thus possibly inculcating 
values which make people less likely to challenge public officials (La Porta et al. 1999; 
Treisman 2000). And religion can impact on economic development because it preaches 
the value of work ethic and thrift (Weber 1930; Landes 1999) perhaps because it is 
underpinned by the idea that to do otherwise may win you eternal condemnation (Barro 
and McCleary 2003). To account for religion I employ data on religious affiliations in 
1900 in an effort to avoid the masking effect of massive twentieth century conversions 
to monotheism in Africa (North et al. 2013).  
                                                          
4
 In the empirical section below I report the F-statistics from the first stage regressions as 
evidence of the strength of the chosen instruments. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggested the rule 
of thumb that, with one endogenous regressor, instruments be deemed weak if the first-stage F 
is less than 10. As explained by Stock and Yogo (2005), this rule of thumb is approximately a 
5% test that the worst-case relative bias of TSLS is around 10% or less. According to these 
authors, the same test with two endogenous regressors and five instruments (my case) implies a 
critical value of 8.76. A tighter 5% test requiring that the worst-case relative bias of TSLS is 5% 
with two endogenous regressors means a critical value of 13.97.  
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Empirical results 
Before considering the impact of individualism on economic development in the 
presence of government quality, I turn to the relationship between individualism and 
governance to establish their correlation, since this is a necessary condition for 
examining the presence of bias in the estimated impact of individualism on 
development due to the omission of government quality. Table 1 presents regressions of 
one variable on the other, both OLS and with TSLS employing pronoun drop as an 
instrument for individualism and legal origins as an instrument of governance. The 
results reported in Table 1 indicate that the direction of causality runs both ways: more 
individualist countries will tend to have better governance as expected given the 
previous discussion. But better governance also reinforces individualism. Consistent 
with this, Hruschka and Henrich (2013) provide empirical support for the idea that the 
presence of social institutions that can buffer risk reduces the need to reinforce in-group 
ties as a source of social insurance and support (see also, Norris and Inglehart 2004).
5
  
Table 1 about here 
Regardless of the direction of causality, for my purposes here the relevant point is that 
insofar as individualism is positively related to government quality, then the omission of 
the latter from regressions which calibrate the impact of individualism on development 
are likely to generate point estimates that are upward biased, assigning to individualism 
the effect of governance on development. Table 2 presents the basic estimates when 
regressing GDP per capita on both individualism and government quality. It presents 
both OLS and TSLS estimates. With regards to the latter, the F-statistics from the first 
stage confirm the strength of the chosen instruments since they are generally above the 
suggested critical values when there are one or two endogenous regressors. Moreover, 
the p-values from the over-identification tests always exceed 0.100, meaning that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous.  
The results are revealing. The strong positive impact of individualism on development 
disappears in the presence of government quality. Moreover, the point estimate of 
individualism drops markedly when government quality is added to the regression. 
These findings are robust to the use of OLS and TSLS as well as the introduction of the 
full set of controls. In light of the positive relationships identified in table 1, these 
results raise the possibility that the positive impact of individualism on development 
passes through its benign effect on governance. 
Table 2 about here 
In table 3 I consider the robustness of the results to a set of potentially endogenous 
regressors. In particular, I control for cross-country differences in human capital, the 
degree of ethnic heterogeneity, interpersonal inequality, the relative size of urban 
populations and the percentage of people who declare that they tend to trust strangers. I 
control for education because of the possibility that it may be positively related to 
                                                          
5 
Because of the strong correlation between log GDP per capita and government quality (0.807), 
controlling for the latter in the lower panel of table 1 raises the spectre of inflated standard 
errors due to multicollinearity, especially when applying TSLS (see for example, Woodridge 
2006). Another problem with introducing an endogenous regressor that is positively correlated 
with individualism and government quality is that it will tend to bias the impact of governance 
downwards (see Acemoglu et al. 2001 for the proof).  
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individualism (G-R, 2013) and because human capital matters for both development and 
governance (Glaeser et al. 2004; Tabellini, 2008).
6
 Ethnic heterogeneity can be 
pernicious for both economic development and governance (Alesina and La Ferrara 
2005) and can increase the salience of in-group affiliation thus contributing towards 
collectivism (Schwartz 2004; Licht et al 2007). Inequality can worsen government 
quality (You and Khagram 2005) and can undermine long-run growth either directly 
(Easterly 2007) or through its effect on governance (Halter et al. 2014). Moreover, 
collectivist societies tend to be more unequal and hierarchical (Triandis 1995). 
Alternatively, urbanization may weaken collectivist ties (for example, Triandis 1995; 
Freeman 1997; Oyserman et al. 2002) and has been linked to development (for example, 
Kuznet 1968; Acemoglu et al. 2002) and better governance (Billger and Goel 2009). 
Finally, given the discussion in section 2 above I also control for the prevalence of 
generalized trust. The results in Table 3 indicate that the inclusion of these variables 
does not change the main finding: individualism does not have a statistically significant 
impact on long-run growth in the presence of government quality.  
Table 3 about here 
In table 4 I consider the robustness of the previous findings when employing indicators 
of economic development similar to those used by G-R (2011a, 2013). Specifically, I 
employ income per worker in logs, total factor productivity and the number of patents 
by residents (again in logs).
7
 The results indicate the fundamental role played by 
government quality in explaining cross-country differences in these variables (see Hall 
and Jones 1999 for similar findings). The importance of good governance for long-run 
growth can also be seen from the regressions in table 5 which employ I-C indicator 
based on Schwartz (1994). All in all, the results in these two tables reinforce the idea 
that government quality may be an important channel through which individualism 
impacts on economic development. 
Tables 4 and 5 about here 
 
Conclusion 
 
An individualist society tends to value personal control and autonomy and attaches 
social status to individual accomplishments. A collectivist society prizes loyalty and 
cohesion and imposes mutual obligations in the context of in-groups – obligations 
which can exert pressure to redistribute resources to other members of the group. In the 
private, market sphere this leads to the expectation that societies arrayed along the I-C 
dimension will differ in their long-term growth prospects and in particular one would 
expect individualist societies to do better because they sharpen individual incentives to 
invest, innovate and accumulate wealth. But the I-C dimension also has an incidence on 
                                                          
6
 Controlling for human capital also helps reinforce the exclusion restriction when using legal 
origins as instruments for governance. It has been argued that English colonial rule pursued 
more enlightened educational policies compared to French rule (Rostowski and Stacescu 2006 
as cited in La Porta et al. 2008). Thus, education could be an additional channel through which 
legal origins can affect development. In appendix C I further pursue the exogeneity of legal 
origins as instruments. 
7
 G-R also employ the Innovation Performance Index, published by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, which provides information on both the number of patents and their value. I don’t use this 
variable in the analysis because some of its components include institutional environmental 
variables (EUI, 2009). 
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the public sphere where individualism translates to meritocracy and individual potential 
as well as the historical emergence of formal institutions which facilitate impersonal 
exchange while collectivism implies in-group favoritism in the form of nepotism and 
clientelism and a history of informal contract enforcement within identified groups. 
From this vantage point individualist societies should do better insofar as they achieve 
stronger property right protection and rule of law, lower corruption and higher 
bureaucratic efficiency.  
The empirical evidence reported in this article suggests that the positive impact of 
individualism on economic development is due to its benign effect on governance. 
Specifically, I first document the strong positive correlation between individualism and 
government quality and find evidence that the causality runs both ways. Individualism 
is conducive towards higher government quality but good governance may also 
contribute towards a more individualist culture perhaps because it reduces the 
importance of strong in-group ties as a source of social insurance and support. Second, I 
find that the positive impact of individualism on economic development disappears in 
the presence of government quality. Specifically, the inclusion of governance as an 
additional regressor markedly reduces the point estimate and eliminates the statistical 
significance of individualism. This result is robust to the inclusion of a wide set of 
controls, different ways of measuring economic development and the I-C dimension, as 
well as estimation methods which strive to account for the likelihood that more 
developed countries may be more individualist and have better governance. 
A growing body of work in economics has identified the role of long-term factors such 
as geography, history and culture in explaining the wealth of nations (see Spolaore and 
Wacziarg 2013 for a review). These authors admit that cultural norms change slowly 
over time (see also North 1990; Williamson, 2000; Roland 2004) but are optimistic that 
globalization may facilitate “greater convergence of norms and values, facilitating the 
horizontal diffusion of technological and institutional innovations” (p. 364). While it is 
difficult to say what the future holds, the analysis presented in this article indicates that 
a fuller understanding of cross-country differences in economic development would be 
gained by a consideration of the origins of cultural differences across societies, the 
process of cultural change and diffusion and the specific causal channels through which 
culture and governance interact.  
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Figure 1. Individualism and economic development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Individualism and economic development controlling for governance 
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Figure 3. Individualism and governance controlling for economic development 
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Table 1. Individualism and government quality  
 OLS TSLS 
 Dependent variable is Government Quality 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Individualism 0.595*** 
(0.046) 
0.325*** 
(0.048) 
0.285*** 
(0.084) 
0.113* 
(0.063) 
0.683*** 
(0.093) 
0.460*** 
(0.110) 
0.624* 
(0.313) 
0.213 
(0.291) 
Log of GDP per capita  0.082*** 
(0.010) 
 0.090*** 
(0.015) 
 0.070*** 
(0.016) 
 0.086*** 
(0.023) 
Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
No. of observations 94 94 93 93 83 83 82 82 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.552 0.75 0.695 0.828 0.518 0.724 0.622 0.817 
F-statistic from first 
stage: Pronoun Drop 
    46.394 41.324 13.960 13.997 
 Dependent variable is Individualism 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Government Quality 0.935*** 
(0.082) 
0.927*** 
(0.129) 
0.435*** 
(0.134) 
0.306* 
(0.176) 
0.739*** 
(0.128) 
0.644*** 
(0.242) 
0.530** 
(0.216) 
0.282 
(0.512) 
 
Log of GDP per capita  0.001 
(0.016) 
 0.025 
(0.023) 
 0.035 
(0.030) 
 0.027 
(0.055) 
Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
No. of observations 94 94 93 93 94 94 93 93 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.552 0.574 0.704 0.704 0.537 0.529 0.702 0.704 
F-statistic from first 
stage: Legal Origins 
    10.371 50.339 17.270 27.170 
Notes: All regressions include a constant (not shown) and report White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 
1 % levels respectively. Individualism is the Hofstede measure and Government Quality is from the ICRG. Controls are Continental dummies, latitude, the percentage of population 
practicing Protestantism, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, Chinese folk religion, Buddhism or Hinduism. Individualism is instrumented with Pronoun Drop and Government 
Quality is so by legal origins. When I report the F-statistic from the first stage I indicate the excluded instrument. 
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Table 2. Individualism, governance and economic development 
 Dependent variable is Log of GDP per Capita 
 OLS 
 1 2 3 4 
Individualism 3.297*** 
(0.371) 
0.034 
(0.391) 
1.899*** 
(0.554) 
0.502 
(0.4349) 
Government Quality  5.477*** 
(0.535) 
 4.896*** 
(0.587) 
Controls NO NO YES YES 
No. of observations 94 94 93 93 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.359 0.643 0.648 0.802 
  TSLS 
 1 2 3   4 
Individualism 3.167*** 
(0.634) 
0.491 
(0.853) 
4.777** 
(2.038) 
0.519 
(0.747) 
Government Quality  4.109*** 
(0.876) 
 6.385*** 
(0.904) 
Controls NO NO YES YES 
No. of observations 83 83 82 82 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.333 0.621 0.493 0.756 
F-statistic from first stage: 
Pronoun Drop 
46.990 9.935 13.960 14.484 
F-statistic from first stage: 
Legal Origins 
 12.572  14.543 
Over-id test (p-value)  0.113  0.977 
Notes: All regressions include a constant (not shown) and report White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels respectively. Individualism is the 
Hofstede measure and Government Quality is from the ICRG. Controls are Continental dummies, latitude, the 
percentage of population practicing Protestantism, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, Chinese folk religion, 
Buddhism or Hinduism.  Individualism is instrumented with Pronoun Drop while Governance is so by way of legal 
origins. When I report the F-statistic from the first stage I indicate the excluded instrument(s).   
 
22 
 
Table 3. Robustness to additional controls, TSLS 
 Dependent variable is Log of GDP per Capita 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Individualism 0.269 
(0.784) 
0.449 
(0.714) 
0.568 
(0.746) 
0.650 
(0.735) 
0.039 
(0.945) 
-0.336 
(1.217) 
Government Quality 6.691*** 
(0.947) 
6.441*** 
(0.945) 
5.767*** 
(0.923) 
5.475*** 
(1.263) 
7.643*** 
(1.226) 
8.730*** 
(2.881) 
Education 0.022 
(0.279) 
    -0.068 
(0.465) 
Ethnic Heterogeneity  0.086 
(0.410) 
   0.249 
(0.724) 
Interpersonal Inequality   1.748 
(1.377) 
  2.135 
(2.471) 
Urban Population    0.871 
(0.861) 
 -0.962 
(1.724) 
Generalized Trust     -0.132 
(1.005) 
0.877 
(1.073) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 77 82 73 81 68 57 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.740 0.752 0.803 0.782 0.690 0.605 
F-statistic from first stage: 
Pronoun Drop 
14.927 13.504 13.020 16.610 11.501 11.179 
F-statistic from first stage: 
Legal origins 
18.888 13.559 13.431 16.282 10.612 12.940 
Over-id test (p-value) 0.965 0.976 0.415 0.976 0.885 0.810 
Notes: All regressions include a constant (not shown) and report White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels respectively. Individualism is the 
Hofstede measure and Government Quality is from the ICRG. Controls are Continental dummies, latitude, the 
percentage of population practicing Protestantism, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, Chinese folk religion, 
Buddhism or Hinduism.  Individualism is instrumented with Pronoun Drop while Governance is so by way of legal 
origins. When I report the F-statistic from the first stage I indicate the excluded instrument(s). 
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Table 4. Robustness to alternative measures of economic development, TSLS  
 Log of Income per 
Worker 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
Log of Patents 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Individualism 4.627** 
(1.942) 
0.679 
(0.837) 
1.444* 
(0.784) 
0.033 
(0.281) 
13.807** 
(6.454) 
2.284 
(3.581) 
Government Quality  6.047*** 
(1.037) 
 1.924*** 
(0.331) 
 10.121** 
(4.656) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 82 82 70 70 75 75 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.476 0.692  0.357 0.393 0.471 
F-statistic from first 
stage: Pronoun Drop 
13.960 14.484 12.395 13.507 13.281 13.870 
F-statistic from fist stage: 
Legal origins 
 14.543  12.244  13.748 
Over-id test (p-value)  0.942  0.132  0.137 
Notes: All regressions include a constant (not shown) and report White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels respectively. Individualism is the 
Hofstede measure and Government Quality is from the ICRG. Controls are Continental dummies, latitude, the 
percentage of population practicing Protestantism, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, Chinese folk religion, 
Buddhism or Hinduism.  Individualism is instrumented with Pronoun Drop while Governance is so by way of legal 
origins. When I report the F-statistic from the first stage I indicate the excluded instrument(s). 
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Table 5. Robustness to the Schwartz measure of the I-C dimension 
 Dependent variable is Log of GDP per Capita 
 OLS 
 1 2 3 4 
Individualism 0.505*** 
(0.050) 
0.240 
(0.069) 
0.324*** 
(0.058) 
0.050 
(0.070) 
Government Quality  3.252*** 
(0.601) 
 4.351*** 
(0.955) 
Controls NO NO YES YES 
No. of observations 61 61 60 60 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.655 0.774 0.754 0.863 
  TSLS 
 1 2 3   4 
Individualism 0.554*** 
(0.087) 
0.201 
(0.158) 
0.398** 
(0.171) 
0.025 
(0.159) 
Government Quality  2.943*** 
(1.201) 
 5.840*** 
(1.820) 
Controls NO NO YES YES 
No. of observations 58 58 57 57 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.625 0.762 0.725 0.829 
F-statistic from first stage: 
Pronoun Drop 
19.673 6.488 11.654 14.003 
F-statistic from first stage: 
Legal Origins 
 10.369  12.396 
Over-id test (p-value)  0.523  0.546 
Notes: All regressions include a constant (not shown) and report White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels respectively. Individualism is the 
first principle component of intellectual and affective autonomies and embeddedness from Schwartz (1994) while 
Government Quality is from the ICRG. Controls are Continental dummies, latitude, the percentage of population 
practicing Protestantism, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, Chinese folk religion, Buddhism or Hinduism.  
Individualism is instrumented with Pronoun Drop while Governance is so by way of legal origins. When I report 
the F-statistic from the first stage I indicate the excluded instrument(s). 
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Appendix A. Summary statistics 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Individualism-Hofstede 0.396 0.31 0.91 0.06 0.225 94 
Indvidualism-Schwartz 0.134 0.103 3.163 -3.256 1.635 61 
Government Quality 0.615 0.586 0.947 0.277 0.180 94 
Log GDP Per Capita 8.925 9.093 10.811 5.892 1.226 94 
Log GDP per Worker 9.842 10.053 11.518 6.819 1.169 94 
Total Factor Productivity  0.685 0.682 1.236 0.179 0.240 79 
Log Patents 5.517 5.485 12.705 0.511 2.722 87 
Latitude 0.338 0.346 0.722 0.011 0.201 94 
Protestants 1900 0.151 0.007 0.995 0 0.289 93 
Catholics 1900 0.351 0.064 0.999 0 0.412 93 
Orthodox 1900 0.055 0.000 0.882 0 0.174 93 
Muslim 1900 0.153 0.001 1.000 0 0.299 93 
Chinese Folk Religion 1900 0.034 0 0.894 0 0.151 93 
Buddhism 1900 0.040 0 0.909 0 0.156 93 
Hindu 0.024 0 0.800 0 0.100 93 
Education 2.519 2.630 3.504 1.171 0.509 88 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.398 0.400 0.859 0.002 0.247 94 
Interpersonal Inequality 0.389 0.364 0.665 0.252 0.097 83 
Urban Population 0.607 0.657 0.100 0.095 0.228 93 
Generalized Trust 0.265 0.236 0.695 0.035 0.141 71 
 
  
26 
 
Appendix B. Data Definitions and Sources 
Individualism -  
Collectivism Hofstede 
I-C according to Hofstede and fully defined in the text. Data normalized 
and ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values describing a more individualist 
society: the most current version of the data is available at 
http://www.geert-hofstede. 
com/.  
Individualism – Collectivism 
Schwartz 
First principle component of the following cultural orientations: 
intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy embeddedness as defined in 
the text: Schwartz (2004).  
Government Quality Expert perceptions about investor protection, law and order, corruption 
and bureaucratic quality (1984-2013), average of the four dimensions. 
The indicator varies between 0 and 1 and higher values imply higher 
government quality: International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk 
Services Group.  
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita at constant prices (1984-2011): Penn World Table 
8.0. 
GDP per worker  Real GDP per worker at constant prices (1984-2011): Penn World Table 
8.0.  
Total Factor Productivity TFP level at current PPPs, USA=1 (1984-2011): Penn World Table 8.0. 
Patents Patent applications by residents (1984-2012): World Development 
Indicators.  
Latitude Absolute values of latitude of country scaled between 0 and1. (La Porta et 
al. 1999).  
Religion Religious affiliation (Protestants, Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Chinese 
folk religion, Buddhist, Hindu) as a percentage of population in 1900: 
North et al. (2013). 
Education Index of human capital per person, based on years of schooling and 
returns to education. (1984-2011): Penn World Table 8.0. 
Ethnic heterogeneity The probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population 
belonged to different groups, computed as one minus the Herfindahl 
index of ethnolinguistic group shares: Alesina et al. (2003). 
 
Inequality Gini coefficient (1984-2012): World Development Indicators. 
Urban population Urban population as a percentage of total (1984-2013): World 
Development Indicators. 
Generalized trust Percentage of people responding affirmatively to the question:“Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with people?” (1981-2008): World Values 
Survey.  
Private credit  Domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP (1984-2013). 
World Development Indicators.  
Pronoun drop Dummy variable which equals 1 if the rule forbidding first person 
pronoun drop is operative and 0 otherwise: Abdurazokzoda and Davis 
(2014). 
Legal Origins Dummy variables which identify the legal origin of the company law or 
commercial code of each country: (1) English common law; (2) French 
commercial code; (3) German commercial code; (4) Scandinavian 
commercial code; (5) socialist communist laws (La Porta et al. 1999). 
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Appendix C. The exclusion restriction of legal origins  
Because of a concern that legal origins may impact on economic development either 
directly or through some other, uncontrolled for variable I pursue the matter further 
here. The first two columns of table C1 report the results obtained when regressing GDP 
per capita on legal origins directly. The fact that the impact of legal origins on GDP per 
capita all but disappears when adding government quality to the model, suggests that 
the impact of legal origins passes through government quality.  
Table C1.  
  Dependant variable is Log of GDP per Capita 
 OLS TSLS 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Individualism 1.549** 
(0.644) 
0.478 
(0.559) 
0.823 
(1.038) 
4.864* 
(2.582) 
-0.414 
(0.793) 
Government Quality  4.332*** 
(0.768) 
6.855*** 
(2.324) 
 6.680*** 
(0.987) 
French LO -0.4354* 
(0.247) 
-0.103 
(0.220) 
   
German LO 0.324 
(0.269) 
0.092 
(0.206) 
   
Scandinavian LO 0.010 
(0.440) 
-0.118 
(0.350) 
   
Soviet LO -1.111*** 
(0.246) 
-0.370* 
(0.220) 
   
Private Credit   -0.003 
(0.007) 
  
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 93 93 81 40 40 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.708 0.797 0.676  0.677 
F-statistic from first stage: 
Pronoun Drop 
  14.343 7.657 7.408 
F-statistic from fist stage: 
Legal origins 
  19.390  9.572 
Over-id test (p-value)   0.961  0.231 
Notes: All regressions include a constant (not shown) and report White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels respectively. Individualism is the 
Hofstede measure and Government Quality is from the ICRG. Controls are Continental dummies, latitude, the percentage 
of population practicing Protestantism, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, Chinese folk religion, Buddhism or 
Hinduism.  Individualism is instrumented with Pronoun Drop while Governance is so by way of legal origins. When I 
report the F-statistic from the first stage I indicate the excluded instrument(s). Columns 4 and 5 are based on a sample 
excluding Western European colonies (following Hariri 2012). 
La Porta et al. (2008) review the legal origins literature and conclude that they affect the 
allocation of resources through their impact on finance, labor markets, and competition. 
But, they explain, the empirical evidence shows that rather than affecting aggregate 
economic growth, legal origins influence the patterns of growth within industries. 
Notwithstanding this, the authors point to Beck et al. (2000) and Levine et al. (2000) 
who link legal origins to private credit and from there to economic growth. To account 
for the effect of legal origins on finance and from there on economic development, in 
column 3 of table B1, I add private credit as an additional explanatory variable in the 
second stage. My results remain the same. The last two columns repeat the basic 
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regressions but based on a sample which excludes Western European colonies. I do this 
to account for the possibility that legal origins may be picking up the impact of 
colonization on development for reasons that go beyond legal transplantation (Bertocchi 
and Canova 2002; Feyrer and Sacerdote 2006). Again my main findings are maintained 
although the F-statistics from the first stage indicate a potential problem with weak 
instruments.  
 
 
 
 
 
